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COMMENTS
REMARRIAGE AND WRONGFUL DEATH
INTRODUCTION
This article will analyze whether a jury should be allowed to con-
sider a surviving spouse's remarriage or the possibility thereof when
awarding wrongful death damages. Factually, the question usually
arises when the decedent's surviving spouse has remarried or becomes
engaged prior to the time he or she comes to trial to collect wrongful
death damages arising from the decedent's death. However, if only
actual remarriage and not its possibility were allowed to be considered
by the jury, "The widow who remarries the day after trial would re-
ceive an unjust preference over the widow who remarries the day
before trial."1 The surviving spouse, therefore, may be found in one
of the following situations at the time of trial: He or she may (1)
actually have remarried, (2) have definite plans to remarry soon after
trial, or (3) have only the possibility of remarriage of any unmarried
person at some uncertain future date. This article will deal primarily
with the situations where the surviving spouse has actually remarried
or has definite plans to remarry soon after the trial since most of the
courts discussing this problem have considered these two situations.
However, the English court in Hall v. Wilson2 did allow the considera-
tion of evidence of the mere possibility of remarriage. The court in that
case stated that:
Although this lady is quite firmly of opinion and perhaps
rightly of opinion, that she will never marry again, she is an
attractive young woman who might marry again; one cannot
ignore the possibility that she may marry again, and I take
that into consideration.3
Since the admission of evidence of remarriage or the imninent
possibility thereof may cause a reduction of the spouse's death damages,
it is important to determine whether such a reduction is in accord with
or contrary to the theory of tort damages. Thus, it is necessary to re-
view, for a moment, the very nature of tort damages themselves. It is
well recognized in tort law that the award of damages to an injured
party is for the purpose of compensating that party for his actual loss:
"... a person injured by the commission of a tort is entitled to pecuniary
compensation for the actual injury sustained. . . ."4 The total loss suf-
fured by the injured party must be distinguished from that party's
actual loss. A portion of the total loss sustained by the injured party is
"Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d 760, 763 (Del. 1965).
2 [1939] 4 All E.R. 84.
3 Id. at 87.
4 22 Am. JuL- 2d Damages §80 (1965).
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often compensated for by any number of factors, such as employer
compensation funds, free hospitalization and so forth. The actual loss
figure, thus, is arrived at by subtracting these compensating benefits
from the total loss sustained. In the trial of a tort case, the actual loss
figure can be arrived at only by admitting evidence of both the total
loss and the amount by which this loss has been satisfied. This latter
evidence is designated as "mitigating" evidence and hence the term
mitigating damages. Thus, actual damages refers to the total damage
figure as reduced by mitigating evidence.
Although the term "actual loss" refers to a mitigated loss, it has
been generally held by the courts that ". . . benefits received by the
plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the
wrongdoer will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from
the wrongdoer." 5 This rule, known as the "collateral source"6 rule, is
recognized as an exception to the previously described actual damage
rule. Since this rule is in conflict with the theory of mitigated or actual
damages, the essential question in this article is whether the collateral
source rule should be applied in those wrongful death cases in which
the surviving spouse's marital status may have affected his or her actual
loss.
SCOPE OF DEATH STATUTES AND DEATH DAMAGES
There are two types of statutory wrongful death remedies which
allow death damages to a surviving spouse: the survival remedy and
the wrongful death remedy. This article will be limited to those statutes
which create a new cause of action in the survivors of the decedent
since the issue of the surviving spouse's remarriage will only be a
factor in the determination of damages in an action for the surviving
spouse's loss. The issue of remarriage is not relevant in determining
damages which the defendant inflicted on the decedent himself before
his death.
Since the wording of the wrongful death statutes in the various
jurisdictions differ, it is impossible to lay down a rule for wrongful
death damages applicable to all jurisdictions in this country. However,
most of the death acts in the United States are patterned after the
English "Fatal Accidents Act," which is more commonly known today
as the Lord Campbell's Act.7 The death damages discussed in this
article will refer only to those damages which are allowed by those
statutes which are patterned after the Lord Campbell's Act.
5 Id. at §206.
6 Ibid.
7 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §925 comment a (1939). The following forms of death
statutes have been enacted in the minority of jurisdictions: (1) the survival
statutes which also provide for an additional award for the decedent's death,
and (2) the statutes which impose death damages based upon the defendant's
culpability. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 924-925 (3d ed. 1964.)
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In his examination of the beneficiary's wrongful death recovery
under the Lord Campbell's Act, Dean Prosser states that ". . . in gen-
eral, however, it is still repeated that the measure of recovery is the
value of the support, services and contributions which the beneficiary
might have expected to recover if death had not intervened. ' 8 As to
this measure of recovery, the question is whether the amount "the
beneficiary might have expected to recover if death had not intervened"
should be mitigated by the fact that the surviving spouse has remarried
or has the possibility thereof.
REMARRIAGE OR ITS POSSIBILITY AND THE MITIGATION
OR NON-MITIGATION OF DEATH DAMAGES
1. Present Status of the Law
The vast majority of the jurisdictions in this country maintain that
the surviving spouse's marital status should not be considered by the
jury when it determines the spouse's wrongful death damages.' The
majority of courts thus uphold the position that the wrongful death
damages are not to be mitigated by factors such as remarriage. This
position is also in accord with the "collateral source" rule.
Wisconsin, at the present time, is the only American jurisdiction
which recognizes that "The possibility of marriage or remarriage is
always an element which is proper for the jury to consider in determin-
ing damages in a wrongful death action." 10 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court recognized this rule in the 1964 case of Jen.sen v. Heritage Mut.
Ins. Co.'1 But in that case the court added that:
We are not prepared, however, to hold as a matter of law
that the instant damages are excessive merely because of the
early marriage ... it is pure speculation that the new husband
will be able to provide plaintiff with the same amount of
support that the deceased husband would be likely to have
provided. Loss of society and companionship is an intangible
which is extremely difficult to measure in the terms of dollars
and cents. Likewise there is no assurance that plaintiff will be
as happy in her new marriage as allegedly in the prior one.12
Prior to Wisconsin's acknowledgment of this rule, Michigan was
recognized as the only jurisdiction which allowed the jury to consider
the surviving spouse's present and future marital status. 3 Then, in the
8 PossER, LAW OF TORTS 930 (3d ed. 1964).
9 Annot., 87 A.L.R2d 252, 253 (1963).10 Jensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 23 Wis.2d 344, 355, 127 N.W.2d 228, 234
(1964). It should be noted that in Truesdill v. Roach, 11 Wis.2d 492, 105
N.W.2d 871 (1960), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Wis. STAT.§895.04 (1965) creates a new cause of action for the loss sustained by the
beneficiaries.1123 Wis.2d 344, 127 N.W.2d 228 (1964).
=.2 Id. at 355, 127 N.W.2d at 234.
13 See Note 9 Supra.
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1965 case of Bunda v. Hardwick,1 4 the Michigan Supreme Court ex-
pressly overruled those Michigan decisions which allowed the jury to
consider the surviving spouse's marital status. The court overruled its
prior decisions on the grounds that the rule in the prior decisions was
mistakenly adopted15 and contrary to Michigan's adherence to the
"collateral source" rule. 16
As to the foreign jurisdictions, the English 17 and Australian' s
courts have recognized that the marital status of the surviving spouse
should be taken into consideration.
2. The Validity of the Majority Position
The reason the majority of courts do not allow the jury to considei
the surviving spouse's marital status is aptly stated in the much cited
case of The City of Rome.' 9 The court reasoned that:
[I] f we should enter upon an inquiry as to the relative merits
of the new husband as a provider coupled with his age, employ-
ment, condition of health, and other incidental elements con-
cerning him, unavoidably we would embark upon a realm of
speculation and be led into a sea of impossible calculation.
Moreover, adherence to the rule followed by the commissioner
[in disallowing consideration of the surviving spouse's marital
status] seems essential to consistency with the holding that,
upon the death of the first husband there was "an immediate,
final and absolute vesting in his widow, if the statutory bene-
ficiary, of a cause of action on that account. 20
Thus, the refusal to consider the surviving spouse's marital status is
attributed to two basic reasons: (1) wrongful death damages are de-
terminable immediately at the time of the decedent's death and at no
time thereafter; and (2) a comparison of the prospective earnings,
services, and contributions of the deceased spouse with those of the
new spouse would be highly speculative. 2'
With regard to the first proposition, the majority of courts would
maintain that wrongful death damages are determinable only in relation
to the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the decedent's
death without any consideration of any changes which have occurred
by the time of the trial. Thus, Dean Prosser apparently interpreted
wrongful death damages as unmitigated when he stated that:
. .. under Lord Campbell's Act and the great majority of the
death acts, however, the action proceeds on the theory of
14376 Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965).15 Id. at 648, 138 N.W.2d at 311.
16 Ibid.
17Hall v. Wilson, [1939] 4 All E.R. 84; Mead v. Clarke Chapman & Co., [1956]
1 Weekly L.R. 76, [1956] 1 All E.R. 44 (C.A.).
18 Willis v. Commonwealth, 73 Commw. L.R. 105 (1946).
19 48 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1930).
201d. at 343.
21 See Note 9 supra.
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compensating the individual beneficiaries for the loss of the
economic benefit which they might reasonably have expected
to receive from the decedent in the form of support, services
or contributions during the remainder of his lifetime if he
had not been killed.
22
Prosser would apparently maintain that even though the surviving
spouse in one way or another has been fully compensated for his or
her losses by means other than wrongful death damages, this spouse
would still be entitled to wrongful death damages in the amount he
or she could have reasonably expected "to receive from the decedent
in the form of support, services or contribution during the remainder
of his lifetime if he had not been killed." If Prosser's interpretation is
accurate, then the jury should not be allowed to consider the surviving
spouse's marital status for the purpose of mitigating the wrongful
death damages.
This proposition appears to rely on inconsistent theories. Simoneau
v. Pacific Elec. Co.2 is an illustration of this. Evidence which detailed
various illnesses suffered by members of the deceased's family after
his death was held inadmissible for the following reason:
Changed conditions in the family of the deceased, adverse
circumstances, or misfortunes in the way of sickness, which
are in no way connected with or related to the death of the
deceased, but occur subsequently thereto . . . are inadmissible
for any purpose.2
However, the court allowed evidence which pertained to the crippled
condition of two of his children because they were crippled prior to
his death. The court stated that:
By reason of their permanent afflictions existing at the death of
their father, they had a right to expect from him, had he
lived, a future measure of comfort, care, and assistance than
had their afflictions not existed.
25
This latter reason, however, could also be applied to the family's later
misfortunes since the father would presumably support the family
through all later misfortunes. The former, however, would disallow
jury consideration of any of the family's misfortunes, whether past
or present, as not "connected with or related to" the decedent's death
in any way. It is only a coincidence that the decedent's death occurred
at a time when his children were crippled.
Furthermore, statutory "construction also leads to the conclusion
that death damages should be mitigated. The original wrongful death
statute was enacted in England in 1848 under the title "Fatal Accidents
2 2 PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 928 (3d ed. 1964).
23 166 Cal. 264, 136 Pac. 544 (1913).
24 Id. at 272, 136 Pac. at 550.
25 Id. at 271, 136 Pac. at 549.
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Act. ' 26 Today, this Act is more commonly known as Lord Campbell's
Act. The statute was enacted to contravene the existing common law
decisions which left the decedent's family and dependents without a
remedy.22 The purpose of this statute was to provide the decedent's
dependents with a sufficient monetary award against the person whose
negligent or wrongful acts caused the decedent's death in order to
enable them to subsist without becoming wards of society. It is quite
apparent that it was not within the reason of this statute to provide
the dependents with an award so that they could live more prosperous
lives than they would have had the decedent lived.
This conservative view of wrongful death damages is indicated in
the very wording of Lord Campbell's Act itself. It provides that "in
every such action [for wrongful death] the jury may give such damages
as they may think proportionate to the injury resulting from such
death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such
action shall be brought.128 It is worthy to note that the statute speaks
of "damages . . . proportionate to the injury resulting from such
death. . . ." To consider the proportionate damages resulting from the
decedent's death, the jury must be given a true picture of the surviving
spouse's actual loss due to the decedent's death. Thus, the original
wrongful death statute apparently supports the proposition that the
death damages can, and should, be mitigated and that they are not
determinable immediately upon the decedent's death. One factor which
would mitigate a surviving spouse's loss would be his or her remarriage
or the possibility of remarriage.
This limited purpose of wrongful death damages is suggested in
the following cases. In considering the nature of damages allowable
under the Washington wrongful death statute, the Washington Supreme
Court in Upchurch v. Hubbard,2 9 quoting the language of Hedrick v.
Ilwaco,3° stated that:
The object and purpose of these statutes is to provide a remedy
whereby the family or relative of the deceased, who might
naturally have expected maintenance or assistance from the
deceased had he lived, may recover compensation from the
wrongdoer commensurate with the loss sustained3' (Emphasis
added.)
In State v. Cambria,32 the Connecticut Supreme Court maintained that
the Connecticut wrongful death statute provided the relatives of the
decedent with "a substitute, at least in part, for the support and comfort
26 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
27 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 923-924 (3d ed. 1964).
2S 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 §2.
2929 Wash.2d 599, 188 P.2d 82 (1947).
304 Wash. 440, 30 Pac. 714, 715 (1892).
3129 Wash.2d 599, 604, 188 P.2d 82, 85 (1947).
32 137 Conn. 604, 80 A.2d 516 (1951).
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which they had lost. ' 33 It is interesting to note that these two jurisdic-
tions apparently have not considered whether the surviving spouse's
remarriage or its possibility is a factor in determining wrongful death
damages.14
This proportionate or mitigated loss concept of wrongful death
damages is reflected in some states' Workmen's Compensation statutes.
As of 1961, the marital status of the surviving spouse has had an
effect on the death benefits allowable under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion statutes of seventeen states3 5 For example, the Maryland Work-
men's Compensation statute provides that:
. . . in case of the remarriage of a dependent widow of a
deceased employee, without dependent children at the time of
the remarriage, she shall receive compensation for one year
after compensation previously awarded her outstanding.36
These statutes, enacted subsequent to the wrongful death statutes 3 7
are explicit expressions of the legislative intent to mitigate wrongful
death recovery because of the remarriage of the surviving spouse. Thus,
the purpose and spirit of both the wrongful death and Workmen's
Compensation statutes lend strong support to the doctrine that the
surviving spouse's marital status should be a factor in the determination
of the spouse's actual rather than her hypothetical loss.
Although the allowing of death damages to be mitigated by evidence
of the surviving spouse's remarriage or the imminent possibility thereof
would contravene the "collateral source" rule, the discussion just con-
cluded would seem to question whether the "collateral source" rule
should be applied to wrongful death actions.
As previously noted, the majority of courts maintain, as their second
reason for denying evidence or remarriage, that if the surviving spouse's
marital status were allowed to be considered by the jury, the comparison
of the prospective earnings, services, and contributions of the deceased
33 Id. at 608, 80 A.2d at 519.34 There are no cases from these jurisdictions cited in the annotation of this
subject in Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 252 (1963) or in the annotated statutes of thesejurisdictions.
352 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 548-549 (1961). Of the
seventeen states listed by Larson which either required widowhood as a con-
dition for receiving Workmen's Compensation death benefits or reduced these
benefits upon the widow's remarriage, the following six jurisdictions have
ruled according to Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 252 (1963) that the surviving spouse's
marital status cannot be taken into consideration in determining death damages
under the wrongful death statutes: Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
Oregon and West Virginia.368B ANN. CODE OF MD., ART. 101, §36(8) (i) (1957).
3 Tiffany writing in 1893 stated that ". . . all the states and territories of the
United States have followed the example of England, and have granted a
remedy to the families of the persons killed by wrongful act, neglect, or de-
fault." TIFFANY, DEATH DY WRONGFUL AcT §19 (1893). And Larson states
that the first Workmen's Compensation statute was enacted in Maryland in
1902. This Maryland statute provided a cooperative accident fund for minors.
2 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §5.20 (1961).
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spouse with those of the new spouse would be highly speculative.3 8
However, the jury's determination of wrongful death damages appears
to be highly speculative by nature. Examining the beneficiaries' wrong-
ful death recovery, Dean Prosser states that:
S. . in general, however, the measure of recovery is the value
of the support, services and contributions which the beneficiary
might have expected to receive if death had not intervened.
This necessarily involves a large element of speculation, turn-
ing on such matters as life expectancy, income, character,
habits and health of the deceased, and his past contributions
to his family, together with the vicissitudes of an uncertain
future.39
The Indiana Supreme Court, in American Motor Car Co. v. Robbins,40
stated that wrongful death damage award "bears some semblance to
conjecture."'4 1 In that case, the jury was concerned with the death
damages due to a father for the death of his eight year old child.
Since the amount of death damages "bears some semblance to con-
jecture" and "involves a large element of speculation," the speculative
argument of the majority of courts with respect to remarriage, while
perhaps having merit, could be extended to frustrate the award of all
wrongful death damages.
Although the Louisiana Appellate Court in Stephens v. Nathchi-
toches Parish School Board42 ruled that the jury may not consider the
surviving spouse's marital status, it cited the following from Pennington
v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co.4 3
[M]ost that the court can do in such [wrongful death] cases
is to exercise sound judicial discretion and award such amounts
as, all the circumstances considered, may seem just to both
litigants and not unduly oppressive to either.-
It appears, however, that the jury would not be considering all the
circumstances if it did not consider the surviving spouse's marital
status. Such oversight could be unduly oppressive on the defendant's
pocketbook. And the court, in such an instance, would not be exercising
its sound judicial discretion.
CONCLUSION
Although the majority of courts maintain that the surviving spouse's
marital status should not be considered in determining wrongful death
damages, the reasoning used by those courts should be re-examined.
The very purpose and language of the wrongful death statutes them-
38 See Note 9 supra.
39 PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 930-931 (3d ed. 1964).
40 181 Ind. 417, 103 N.E. 641 (1913).
4xId. at 421, 103 N.E. at 643.
42 137 So.2d 116 (La. App. 1962).
43242 La. 1, 134 So.2d 53 (1961).
44 137 So.2d 116, 120 (La. App. 1962).
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selves supports the proposition that these damages should be mitigated
by such factors and circumstances as the surviving spouse's marital
status. Furthermore, the reasoning of the majority of courts that the
comparison of the prospective earnings, services, and contributions of
the deceased spouse with those of the new spouse would be highly
speculative has little merit when the speculative nature of death damages
themselves is examined.
ALLEN J. HENDICKS
